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Abstract:
While the rule of law has been an important topic of research for entrepreneurship in transition 
economies, the relationship entrepreneurs have with the body of law remains understudied. 
This article explores everyday legality among politically affiliated and non-affiliated 
businesspeople in Russia; that is, the role of laws, written rules, standards, and requirements 
in their everyday business activities. Drawing on interviews and participant observations 
in Russian communities, I trace how an individual’s political position impacts the ability of 
small entrepreneurs to navigate paperwork and bureaucracy. Utilizing a sociological approach 
to explore the behaviour of the law among businesspeople, my research demonstrates that 
although bureaucracy and written rules affect all entrepreneurs, multiple facets of the law 
constrain or promote an individual’s access to opportunities in different ways. I found that 
political affiliation strengthens the power to succeed in the bureaucratic game, and to protect 
one’s interests through court appeals. In contrast, non-affiliated entrepreneurs are limited in 
their capacity to deal with Russian bureaucracy, and to litigate the state using legal procedures. 
The main conclusion of the research is that political affiliation is the most significant line of 
differentiation and inequality among small and medium-sized enterprises because it affects 
their legal knowledge, their strategies for coping with paperwork, and their opportunities to 
mobilise the law. In addition, the study of small entrepreneurs also shows that in contemporary 
Russia everyone depends greatly on the power of the bureaucratic machine, rather than on the 
power of the law. 
  
Keywords: everyday legality, small entrepreneurship, paperwork, bureaucracy, mobilisation of 
law, post-Soviet studies, Russia
Introduction
A wave of studies from socio-legal scholars has demonstrated how law shapes the everyday lives of 
ordinary people (Ewick & Silbey, 1998; Valverde, 2012; Hendley, 2017; Dorfman, 2017). My research 
was driven by the idea that, unlike many other social groups, entrepreneurs face the law and its 
representatives on an almost daily basis. They are confronted with the law everywhere, trying to 
bring their businesses into accordance with the numerous requirements of state agencies; they 
mobilise the law, appeal to the court or litigate state bodies and authorities. The law constantly 
materialises in the figures of city officials and fire or tax inspectors, but mostly through the 
numerous laws, written rules, standards, and everything that is called paperwork.
Numerous studies on how entrepreneurs cope with paperwork and bureaucracy have illustrated 
the effects of the overregulation of private business on the part of the state. In the current academic 
discourse on entrepreneurship, scholars define state overregulation as the key challenge to the 
sustainability of small business around the world. However, what ‘regulating everything’ means 
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differs across countries.1 In EU countries, the policy boom in regulation has seen remarkable growth 
in the number of regulatory agencies, as more power has been delegated to different regulatory 
institutions – unelected agencies, market actors, local communities, and NGO’s (Gilardi, 2005). In 
addressing the positive outcomes of new regulatory mechanisms, scholars have also noted the 
challenges presented by the distribution of power between state and non-state agencies (Levi-Faur, 
2011; Scott, 2012).
In authoritarian countries like Russia, the rise of regulation appears in another form – the state 
becomes the main agent of control and regulation. This means that the main purpose of the 
state is to produce laws, norms, and standards covering activities subject to accounting and 
reporting (Paneyakh, 2015, p. 23). The unlimited power of the state increases the vulnerability of 
entrepreneurs. Their attempts to cope with the rules and requirements of a number of controlling 
regulatory agencies lead to many negative outcomes, including financial costs and criminal 
prosecution (Dzmitrieva et al., 2016). Businesses in Russia and in some other post-Soviet states 
suffer from voluntary bureaucrats (Kurkchiyan, 2013; Polese, 2014, Chepurenko, 2016), private 
and state predators (Oleinik, 2011; Markus, 2015; Gans-Morse, 2017), and unending paperwork 
(Paneyakh, 2015; Sakaeva, 2015).
While not all entrepreneurs have the same resources or face the same business conditions, they 
are usually investigated as a homogenous socio-economic group. My research concerns the 
comparative analysis of politically affiliated and non-affiliated entrepreneurs in their relationships 
with the body of law and state agencies that govern their business activities. Most of the studies 
on small entrepreneurship in post-Soviet states are written from the perspective of the resistance 
of the weak (Scott, 1989). My examination illustrates that small and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs) in present-day Russia could in fact be capable of coping with bureaucracy and paperwork 
from a position of power. As I will show, laws and written rules could be a window to opportunity, 
a foundation for resistance, an object of manipulation, a weapon of defence, and a tool for 
achieving goals. The main purpose of this comparative analysis of politically affiliated and non-
affiliated entrepreneurs is to trace how political capital effects differentiation and enforces 
inequality between small entrepreneurs with respect to their capacity to cope with paperwork 
and bureaucracy.
Those members of executive and legislative bodies who continue to work in the private sector 
after election are described as ‘moonlighting politicians’ (Gagliarducci, 2009; Geys & Mause, 
2013). There has been much empirical research on how political connection can influence a firm’s 
leverage and tax payments (Faccio, 2006), their access to finance and bank loans (Richter, 2010; 
Szakoniy, 2018), and their abilities to apply innovations (Akcigit et al., 2018). Political affiliation in 
new Russia has also created a type of business with privileges and resources distinct from those 
with no political capital (Sakaeva, 2019; Szakoniy, 2018). While the extant literature on politically 
connected business has mainly focused on corporations (Faccio, 2006; Richter, 2010), I investigate 
the role of political affiliation for small and mid-market actors. I look at the ground-level behaviour 
of SMEs in relation to the body of the law.
The incidence of businesspeople holding elected offices in Russia – in regional and local councils 
– presents an opportunity to explore how and why politically affiliated and non-affiliated 
entrepreneurs differ in their relationship to the law. Regional and local legislative bodies in Russia 
provide ample sources for fieldwork due to the widespread involvement of businesspeople in elected 
offices (Levin, 2014; Sakaeva 2012; 2019; Rastorguev, 2012). There are two kinds of parliamentary 
membership in Russian regional and city councils – full-time and part-time. Business activity is 
forbidden only for full-time members, who are paid a fixed salary. Furthermore, the proportion of 
full-time lawmakers in regional legislatures has decreased over the course of the 2010s.2 Russian 
federal law on local government has in fact set the share of full-time members in city councils to 
a maximum of 10%.
1          The metaphor ‘regulating everything’ was proposed by Colin Scott (2012).
2          For example, in 2012 the parliament of the region where the study was conducted passed a law under which the share 
of full-time parliamentarians was reduced from 50 to 30%.
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Analytically, I rely on an anthropological approach to legality, with its focus on social actors who 
fit into a socio-legal context, and interpret themselves and others, and evaluate their own actions 
and the actions of others accordingly (Silbey & Sarat, 1987; Ewick & Silbey, 1998; 2003). Applying 
political affiliation as the basis of differentiating between businesspeople, I follow the findings 
of Silbey and Ewick that variable dimensions of social status (gender, race, income, professional 
occupation) influence legal knowledge, access to the law, opportunities to mobilise the law, and 
ways of communicating with representatives of the law (Ewick & Silbey, 1998).
The article opens with an explanation of how my research fits into the discussion of the connection 
between the rule of law and the vulnerability of small entrepreneurs in developing economies. I 
will then describe the empirical data of my research. As mentioned, the everyday legality of small 
entrepreneurs is closely connected to and depends on paperwork, through which the overregulated 
state is manifested. In the third section, I will show how politically affiliated and non-affiliated 
entrepreneurs perceive and deal with paperwork and bureaucracy. The final part of the paper 
contains an analysis of the opportunities and constraints regarding the mobilisation of the law3 
available to the two types of entrepreneurs. Focusing on litigation with the state through court 
appeals, I intend to investigate the most common performance of everyday legality among social 
actors. Stressing the issue of access to the law through court appeals among businesspeople, 
I contribute to the small body of studies on the rising demand for law in post-Soviet societies 
(Rojansky, 2014; Markus, 2015; Hendley, 2017; Chepurenko, 2018). This alternative vision challenges 
a strong belief among scholars and the public that legal institutions and the mobilisation of the 
law in Russia are still inefficient and distrustful in litigations with the state.
Everyday legality and entrepreneurship: 
the theoretical foundation of the research
As I mentioned above, having to face the law everywhere is the core differentiating feature of 
businesspeople compared to ordinary citizens. The significance of the law to entrepreneurship, 
even in an informal economy, is well-known (Webb et al., 2013). However, the concept of law has 
been introduced into research on entrepreneurship mostly in order to investigate the line between 
formal and informal, legal and illegal. Meanwhile, according to anthropological evidence, there is 
no division between law and not-law (Ewick & Silbey, 2003; Emerson, 2008; Menjívar, 2011). In this 
section, I will discuss why the use of a socio-legal lens would be fruitful for a better understanding 
of businesspeople’s relationship with the body of the law.
There are three main approaches to exploring the presence of the law in the business sphere, 
depending on whether researchers use large-scale theories or apply a bottom-up perspective. The 
first approach is based on institutional analysis, which addresses the issue of the vulnerability of 
private business under an ineffective state. This approach concerns the debate over the quality of 
state institutions and the effect of state policy in promoting the rule of law. Examining institutional 
environments in post-Soviet economies, scholars primarily explore state predation and pressure 
on businesses (Firestone, 2010; Rojansky, 2014; Rochlitz, 2017).
Supporters of the second approach to studying the role of law in the entrepreneurial sphere move 
closer to the question of the rule of law. They focus on criminal prosecution and other forms of 
violent pressure on business exerted by the state, state agents, or market actors. For instance, 
relying on the number of criminal proceedings against firms, some authors characterise Russia’s 
state policy as economic repression (Nazrullaeva et al., 2013) or criminal regulation (Paneyakh, 
2015).4 Nevertheless, there is no strong empirical evidence of the widespread criminal prosecution 
3         The mobilization of law refers to the process through which adjudicative institutions become involved in the definition, 
interpretation, and management of conflict. Litigation refers exclusively to the mobilization of courts (Sarat & Grossman, 
1975).
4       According to the Russian law, noncriminal acts such as errors in calculating taxes or violations of labor legislation are 
treated as crimes, and thus incur punishments not corresponded to the gravity of the act. (See more Chetverykova & Titaev, 
2017).
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of business (Dzmitrieva et al., 2016). Moreover, scholars connect the criminal regulation of business 
with the punitive justice of the Russian court (Chetverykova & Titaev, 2017). Skipping analytical 
debate on the nature and scope of economic crimes in Russian business, I would support these 
researchers in their suggestion to look more carefully at the varieties of entrepreneurial behaviour 
with regards to the law, and its consequences for their sustainability. As Markus has emphasized, 
our task is to understand what happens when businesspeople face the law and state agents on 
the ground, not to continue arguing over the predatory appearance of the Russian state (Markus, 
2015, p. 62).
The last approach to the relationship of entrepreneurs to the law is framed by the concept of 
everyday legality. This has developed due to the attempt by socio-legal scholars to find the law in 
the everyday life of different social groups, and to look at the law as a culturally driven and socially 
embedded phenomenon (Silbey & Sarat, 1987; Ewick & Silbey, 1998; 2003, Arutiunian et al., 2008; 
Engel, 1993). There is an increasing amount of studies on everyday legality among ordinary citizens 
(Emerson, 2008; Hendley, 2017), as well as among specific social groups, such as immigrants 
(Menjívar, 2011; Valverde, 2012), small entrepreneurs (Kurkchiyan, 2013), or people with disabilities 
(Dorfman, 2017). In post-Soviet states, the everyday dimension of social life is applied to broad 
research topics ranging from everyday governance (Urinboyev et al., 2018) to the everyday life of 
workers (Morris, 2016).
I take the concept of everyday law as the main analytical framework for this study. I rely on the 
sociological approach of everyday legality developed by sociologists Ewick and Silbey in their study 
of ordinary Americans (Ewick & Silbey, 1998; 2003). As they mention, everyday legality is manifested 
not only in appeals to legal institutions, but every time individuals interpret or construct reality in 
categories of law; it includes values, perceptions, and cultural practices that people recognise as 
legal in their daily lives (Ewick & Silbey, 1998,  p. 43). Ewick and Silbey found that social status and 
available resources, also primarily determined by status, significantly influence the perception of 
laws and legal practices among groups and individuals (Ewick & Silbey, 2003, p. 1334). Since the 
vital role of political connections in business success in Russia is well-known (Ledeneva, 2013; 
Levin, 2014; Sakaeva, 2019), I assume that political affiliation performs the function of such a 
distinction of status between SMEs, and influences their ability to cope with the overregulated 
state.
All states materialise through documents and bureaucracy (Dery, 1998, p. 678). However, in the 
current debate about overregulated states, the concept of paperwork takes on special meaning. 
For example, Mathur in her study of everyday bureaucratic life shows how paperwork influences 
the implementation of laws in India (Mathur, 2018). Her anthropological research on street-level 
bureaucracy is about how the state’s addiction to paperwork is framed by and adapted to the 
local context. Following her vision of paperwork as a set of different practices implied by social 
actors (Mathur, 2018, p. 34), I investigate how the dominance of the documentary influences the 
behaviour of small entrepreneurs in Russia. A comparison of politically affiliated and non-affiliated 
entrepreneurs provides strong evidence for the ambiguity of paperwork, for its different meanings, 
and for its effect on the relationship between businesspeople and officials.
In Russia today, 36 federal agencies are eligible to control, monitor, and supervise private business. 
The norms and standards implemented by them and by the numerous regional official bodies, 
their inherent law enforcement capacity, and the structure of their organisations are their power 
credentials – everything is changeable, unclear, and contradictory (Sakaeva, 2015; Krylova, 2018). 
Therefore, I stress the issue of paperwork in my discussion of the everyday legality of small 
entrepreneurs. Much like the scholars who have studied the benefits of politically connected firms 
(Richter, 2010; Levin, 2014; Szakonyi, 2018), I suppose that the strategies for coping with paperwork 
depend on the resources available to businesspeople with political posts.
Socio-legal scholars who have studied everyday law in the United States (Ewick & Silbey, 1998) 
or in Canada (Valverde, 2012) have found a strong link between social status and variations in 
access to the law. Accessibility to the law could be investigated by analysing how, why, and under 
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what circumstances social actors varied in their social status, previous experience, and available 
resources to mobilise the law through court appeals. Litigation with the state through court 
appeals is an important dimension of everyday legality among Russian entrepreneurs, for at least 
two reasons. First, navigation within the ocean of paperwork and coping with countless state 
bodies and officials requires the use of legal mechanisms in disputes, because informality becomes 
ineffective and risky in contemporary Russia (Sakaeva, 2015; Markus, 2015; Krylova, 2018). Second, 
since the beginning of the 2010s, Russians in general (Hendley, 2017), and businesspeople in 
particular (Dzmitryieva et al., 2014;  Chepurenko, 2018), have demonstrated an increasing demand 
for law through litigation with state bodies and officials. In sum, the sociological perspective 
of legality is essential for my analysis, because I will show how and why multiple faces and 
characteristics of the law constrain or promote the set of opportunities available or not available 
to politically affiliated and non-affiliated businesspeople.
Data and method
In the Russian context, the case study approach and qualitative method have demonstrated their 
validity at the intersection of business and law (Varese, 2009; Oleinik, 2011; Chepurenko, 2018), as 
well as in business-vs.-politics studies (Sakaeva, 2012; 2019; Levin, 2014; Ledyaev & Chirikova, 2017). 
In the sociology of entrepreneurship, qualitative studies represent an important contribution to 
the research on small-scale entrepreneurship around the world (Webb et al., 2013). Given its deep 
connections with informality, the topic of politically affiliated entrepreneurs is quite sensitive. This 
means, as Cherupenko notes, “any representative sampling of entrepreneurs using informality 
cannot be designed” (Chepurenko, 2016). I therefore relied on storytelling and narrative analysis 
(Ewick & Silbey, 2003).
I designed and carried out a qualitative survey of SMEs with parliamentary membership in Saint 
Petersburg and the Komi Republic in 2009–2012, while writing my PhD dissertation. The research 
started with the question of the benefits and opportunities available to those entrepreneurs with 
parliamentary membership (at regional and municipal levels) – the business activity of those 
members of local parliaments and municipal bodies who came to politics from business. At first, 
I was interested in their motivation, their election strategies, and the resources they extract for 
their firms through political affiliations (Sakaeva, 2012; 2015). Later, analysing the empirical data, I 
noticed that comments by the entrepreneurs about legal issues would spring up in conversations 
that were seemingly unrelated to legality, but connected to their relationships with the controlling 
and regulating agencies, and to their practices for coping with the numerous laws and standards. 
At the same time, it seemed that they recognised, understood, and paid much attention to the 
power of the law with regard to their businesses, even if I did not ask them about the law, or 
they did not fully realise the impact of the law in their everyday practices. I also realised that 
politically affiliated and non-affiliated entrepreneurs significantly differ in their understanding and 
perceptions of the law, paperwork, and bureaucracy. Therefore, in 2015/16 I collected additional 
empirical data, interviewed new informants and made observations at business events.
The present paper is based on two sources of qualitative data – interviews and observations. 
Between 2012 and 2016, I collected 25 in-depth expert face-to-face interviews. The majority of 
the interviews were obtained in Syktyvkar, the capital of the Komi Republic.5 Material from the 
city of Perm (6 interviews collected in 2015) has served to clarify the findings from Komi. I began 
the interviews with questions about the Russian business environment and the quality of state 
politics in the business sphere. I also asked my informants to share stories of their businesses 
from the beginning, to describe routine, habitual, and common situations when they, or other 
entrepreneurs they know, faced the state and its representatives. Within these narratives, I tried 
to push my informants towards telling me about threats to their businesses and the steps they 
5         The Komi Republic is located in the Russian European North. The region is characterized by infrastructure difficulties 
and undeveloped transport connections. SMEs is concentrated in urban areas (about 80%). Trade, retail, and real estate are the 
most attractive sectors for small entrepreneurs. The Komi Republic is being depopulated: by 2000, the population was down 
to one million, and by 2013 it was inhabited by less than 880,000 individuals.
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took to protect themselves, as well as their strategies for navigating the ocean of state regulation.
Out of 31 interviews, 10 were conducted with former and current members of regional parliaments 
and city councils who also ran businesses, 10 with entrepreneurs and managers of enterprises 
with extensive business experience, 5 with members of regional parliaments and city councils 
or political party functionaries, and 6 with experts (heads of business associations and lawyers). 
The opinions and views given by the experts have suggested an alternative assessment of small 
entrepreneurship. In some cases, the categorisation of the informants was not possible. For 
example, the heads of business associations identified themselves as experienced entrepreneurs 
rather than experts, as they had moved to their current roles from business.6
 
The majority of my informants entered into business between the 1990s and the mid-2000s. All 
of my business informants were the owners or directors of officially registered firms. In terms of 
gender, 7 informants were female and the rest were male. They ranged in age from 35 to 60 years. 
Many interviewees agreed to be recorded; 5 individuals requested that I take notes by hand.7 Of the 
interviewed elected officials, half were local government representatives.
The second source of qualitative data includes observations and audio recordings8 from different 
public events in which businesspeople, state officials, members of business associations, and 
experts participated. I collected the data during the business forum of the North-West Federal 
District, one of the largest federal districts in Russia. The forum was held in Syktyvkar in March 
2016. There was also a series of roundtables and public meetings that were held before the forum 
took place. These events allowed me to explore the opinions of different actors regarding the 
business environment on the ground, and to collect a number of individual stories about coping 
with state agents and agencies.
Paperwork as a bureaucratic game: players’ limits and opportunities
Given that paperwork is the central aspect of everyday legality among entrepreneurs, the aim of 
this part of the article is to analyse the strategies used by politically affiliated and non-affiliated 
entrepreneurs to deal with written rules and bureaucracy. Russian entrepreneurs used to be 
described in terms of a battle against the domination of documentation and the pressure of the 
bureaucratic machine (Ledeneva, 2006; Oleinik, 2011). Indeed, the metaphor of war and its many 
elements – enemies, opponents, fighting, and weapons – were among the main images invoked 
when my respondents shared their perceptions of the controlling and regulating agencies, or 
described their experience of paperwork. While navigating through the world of ‘papereality’9 is 
connected to the image of war, I should shift to the social studies of bureaucracy.
Different images of the paper-war
The narrative of war as a metaphor for the struggle with bureaucracy and written rules is not new, 
and not unique to the everyday experiences of Russians. According to Mathur, “paperwork traps 
all street-level officials” in India (Mathur, 2016, p. 34). This bureaucratic game can be transformed 
into a war when the participants occupy unequal positions of power. A game becomes a war if 
the mobilisation of the law requires access to resources of another sort (social ties, finances, 
administrative resources, violence) (Hendley, 2017, p. 157). However, while not denying the 
importance of the division of power between social actors and organisations involved in the 
bureaucratic game and coping with bureaucracy, Dery emphasized that the largest scope of power 
6         It is also not possible to distinguish between small and medium-sized business entrepreneurs, because a given entrepre-
neur could be the owner or director of several different firms, and the sizes of these firms could vary overtime.
7         I relied mostly on the multiple snowball method. I created a snowball sample, never interviewing more than two people 
from the same network.
8         The audio-recordings ran to about 300 minutes.
9         This definition of “papereality” was suggested by David Dery (1998). Papereality is a world of symbols and new words 
(papers, rules, documents), a particular form of representation that takes precedence over the things and events represented.
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in that sort of game belongs to the written document, rather than to any social agent (Dery, 1998, 
p. 679).
What does my research on everyday legality among Russian small entrepreneurs add to our 
understanding of coping with bureaucracy? The crucial difference between politically affiliated 
and non-affiliated entrepreneurs lies in how they position themselves in the paper-war. Politically 
affiliated businesspeople tended to define the paper-war as a challenge. They found themselves 
powerful enough to deal with the documentary requirements; to struggle against an enemy 
manifested in the state bodies. In many cases, politically affiliated entrepreneurs said they do 
not spend time waiting for doors to open. However, this does not mean that their lives are easy. 
The present research demonstrates that previous studies may have overestimated the importance 
of favourable treatment and networking in easing regulations and facilitating procurement. The 
overregulated state and general deficit of qualified bureaucrats sometimes undercuts the benefits 
that accrue from easy access to decision-makers:
For a year, I have not been able to get permission to start building in one settlement [rural 
county]. I have already made an agreement with the head of the local administration; his 
deputy is my friend. All of them say: “We are on your side; we are with you.” However, it does 
not work out, because the people who work on the ground are incompetent. (Businessman, 
retailer, member of city council B., face-to-face interview, 2015).
When talking about navigating through the paper-war, informants from both groups avoided the 
word corruption and related categories. They either implicitly exclude the topic of corruption, or 
they say that there is no corruption. Some are actually nostalgic about bribes, which simplified 
and accelerated transactions. Others do not problematise bribes at all. The politically affiliated 
informants willingly shared their own experiences of dealing with controlling and regulating 
agencies through personal networks and acquaintances. They mentioned various figures of 
power: the chief of police, the head of the city administration or his deputies, the head of the tax 
inspectorate, the deputy prosecutor, and even the wife of the former governor.
While politically affiliated businesspeople rely on social relations, negotiations, and informality, 
non-affiliated entrepreneurs waste time on rendering accurate representations of what the 
bureaucratic machine requires of them. They shared stories about the endless routine updating, 
revising, and collecting of reports, files, and other written documents. Not surprisingly, their 
stories are characterised by emotions and a negative assessment of bureaucratic bodies and their 
representatives. Perceiving the bureaucracy as something ineffective, useless, and meaningless, 
they expressed a desire for justice from the Russian state.
Thirty people turned to the prosecutor's office. But what was their eventual fate? Did he [the 
prosecutor] feel better or not? If he understood that he addressed you, you got an ally for 
yourself, and the one he complained about would understand that this side will always support 
him. Today, he went underground, tomorrow he needs to get a licence. The day after tomorrow, 
he needs to get some more help. And he will stumble upon situations that are out of the 
ordinary. I am not saying that the prosecutor’s office does not help anyone, it helps, I know. I 
have a specific proposal. If a person turned to you, and you helped him, in the future you will 
still follow his fate, become interested. (Businesswoman, owner of a building company, 
member of city council L., record from the round table, 2016).
Based on the course of the public discussions, I conclude that entrepreneurs, public figures, and 
what is more interesting local officials very often address demands for protection and assistance 
to the prosecutor’s office of the Russian Federation, or of the region. Prosecutors are perceived as 
the only truly powerful representatives of the Russian state.
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The role of knowledge and negotiations in paperwork
Many of my informants stressed the low professional level among street-level bureaucrats. It 
should be mentioned that this is a common feature of state officials in both developed (Valverde, 
2012) and transitional states (Mathur, 2016). Mathur identified a set of reasons for the low level of 
competence among officials in India, and these are also applicable to Russian bureaucrats: street-
level officials are badly educated, overworked, and underpaid, and the sea of documentation they 
have to move through has no limits (Mathur, 2016, p. 13, p. 86).
My research on the practices of entrepreneurs complements the literature on the anthropology 
of bureaucracy by finding that the poor competence of street-level officials increases the value of 
the entrepreneurs’ previous experience and forces them to improve their own level of expertise 
and knowledge. In addition, there is another reason that knowledge, previous experience, and 
professional competence take on special significance for non-affiliated entrepreneurs. Compared 
to politically affiliated businesspeople and large companies, small and medium-sized firms face 
a lack of financial, human, and network resources to successfully cope with bureaucracy and 
written rules; for instance, they are not able to employ qualified lawyers or accountants (Sakaeva, 
2015; Chepurenko, 2018).
I found that those who comply with the papereality in Russia have to keep their attention 
focused on their own behaviour, on the behaviour of the officials, and on summary reports. This 
considerable need to fix and control everything and everybody while operating under a high level 
of uncertainty is an incentive to develop multifunctional personal and professional skills. While 
collecting interviews with non-affiliated entrepreneurs and observing public hearings, I listened to 
many stories about companies that could not obtain a permit, a certificate, or a licence because 
of the specific functioning of the world of papereality. In that world, documents do not agree 
with one another; no officials know what the required file should look like; new sets of rules are 
frequently implemented; a new head of a state body is appointed and he/she introduces his/her 
understanding of a particular written document. The following description provided by the owner 
of a medical equipment store is a typical description of coping with the Russian bureaucratic 
machine.
When you start making money yourself, you become so greedy. Do you think that I am dumber 
than others? I myself will do everything to save every rouble [Russian currency], put it into 
circulation. We prepared all the documents, and it turned out that the requirements had 
already changed: not just one point, but two points. We started collecting new ones. This 
paper-war lasted three or four years. (Businesswoman, owner of a medical equipment 
store, face-to-face interview, 2013)
One of the most unexpected findings of my research is that street-level officials sometimes play on 
the side of the entrepreneur. In other words, everyone is trying to ‘deceive the state’. Both sides 
of the bureaucratic game – the official and the entrepreneur – can make a deal in cases where 
the impracticability of norms is obvious because of their excessive nature and the unjustified 
costs. My respondents gave me the following examples: making plans to reorganise a store, the 
replacement of windows or doors in a shop, moving a shop or an office into another building. 
Both sides in the bureaucratic game can ignore the power of the overregulated state if this power 
also constrains the behaviour of both. The following scenario, described by one of my informants, 
shows the limitations of the typical view of Russian officials as hostile individuals or corrupted 
agents (Nazrullaeva et al., 2013; Markus, 2015; Gans-Morse, 2017).
While I did this all for weeks, we came up with a new standard – the trading platform for 
the merchandise in the store should be no less than a certain area.  I visited the head of 
the department in the city administration. He said: “Well, in the contract, correct this figure 
to another.” He suggested to me how to deceive them! Eventually, they allowed me to do 
everything. I did not know this boss; I just came to his office. If everything is normal, there 
is little to explain, and then everything can be settled. Normal people work there, the system 
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makes them like this. (Businesswoman, owner of an office equipment store, face-to-face 
interview, 2013)
In summary, I should note that in most of the stories shared with me, the experience of coping 
with state agencies and bureaucrats is perceived as a trap. As Dery argued, all the players are 
playing these games with bureaucratic traps (Dery, 1998, p. 681). I also support his idea about the 
power of the written rules being the most significant factor in the bureaucratic reality, whoever 
is involved (Dery, 1998, p. 678). However, the question we should ask here concerns the resources 
and opportunities available to different social actors to help them cope with bureaucratic reality, 
as well as the varied levels of skill and experience possessed by the players to litigate with official 
organisations and actors when facing injustice. In other words, the practices for coping with 
bureaucracy shape the issue of power, which is crucial for the anthropological discourse on law 
and everyday legality (Ewick & Silbey, 2003). As I mentioned earlier, the unequal division of power 
and influence between different social groups in Russia is enforced by the overregulated state, 
which limits the number of legal ways to litigate with the bureaucratic machine. In the next part 
of this study, I will show why access to the law and opportunities to litigate the state are limited 
for non-affiliated entrepreneurs compared to those in political posts.
The mobilisation of the law in litigation with the state:
Comparison of politically affiliated and non-affiliated businesspeople
As I showed above, there are two main challenges produced by the overregulated nature of the 
Russian state: its obsession with paperwork, and the impossibility of following all of the written 
rules and standards implemented by state bodies. Hence, court disputes with state bodies and 
officials play an important role in the practices of everyday legality among businesspeople. A few 
studies have shown that, since the 2000s, Russian and Ukrainian businesses do not just voluntarily 
or forcedly choose legalisation, but in fact actively resort to official mechanisms (for instance, the 
court) for resolving commercial conflicts or litigating with the state (Markus, 2015; Chepurenko, 
2018). My findings, as presented in the final part of the paper, illustrate how and why entrepreneurs 
with and without political posts differ in their attitudes towards the courts, and in the practices 
they follow for the mobilisation of the law through court appeals.
In the case of politically affiliated entrepreneurs, their critical perception of the state very 
often coexists with their personal success in litigation with local authorities and regulating and 
controlling agencies. They have different reasons to litigate with the state. The first motive is 
reducing business costs, in particular, by challenging social obligations. One respondent (a member 
of a city council) talked about his personal experience of litigation with the Pension Fund of the 
Russian Federation. He described the case in terms of a game, and not of resistance, realising his 
strength and capacity to ‘beat the state’. Describing the relationship between businesspeople and 
state agencies through the metaphor of a game is common among politically affiliated informants. 
The game refers to their ability to adapt the varying, ambiguous, changeable norms and laws to 
their own needs. Being a player means being more flexible and powerful under state regulation.
The following selection illustrates the moral and ethical dimensions of the attempts to litigate the 
state. There is another, non-material reason for using the law through court appeals: namely, the 
fight against state agencies in order to create and support a particular reputation, the image of a 
stubborn fighter resisting the state system.
I tried; I won two court hearings and lost one. I fought for my honest name, believing that I 
am not a violator, and I managed to prove this in the courts /…/. I proved in the courts that I 
am not a camel (Businessman, retailer, member of a city council P., face-to-face interview, 
2015).
Access to tools of mobilisation under the law is driven by parliamentary membership, as this 
brings with it access to networks and resources of power. In the case of local communities, 
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a limited number of authorities, elected officials, judges, and other figures in power promote 
communication and cooperation between them, simplifying the sharing of different resources 
(information, networks, knowledge, money, etc.). The network effect of power regimes in local 
communities is well-known in today’s Russia (Ledyaev & Chirikova, 2017).
I found an unexpected link between legality and relationships with the body of law among 
migrant entrepreneurs. According to Menjívar, by becoming more and better informed about legal 
procedures through the immigration process, migrants in the USA become more successful at 
dealing with other contingencies in their lives. The author called this phenomenon ‘legal spillover’ 
(Menjívar, 2011, p. 391). Businesspeople with political posts possess greater legal awareness in 
other spheres of life, even those not connected to their businesses. This means that as they become 
more conscious of the power of the law, they know how to turn it to their advantage.
The role of the different dimensions of social status (gender, income, race, disability) in an 
individual’s propensity to litigate has been investigated in many American studies (Ewick & Silbey, 
1998; Engel & Munger, 2003; Dorfman, 2017). Empirical studies of decision-making in the Russian 
courts show that the law is not an embodiment of the principle of the rule of law. For instance, 
judges are more supportive of representatives of high status social groups (Volkov, 2014). Analysing 
the link between court disputes and political affiliation, I probed not only into why businesspeople 
litigate with the state, but also why they chose not to. Over the course of the interviews and public 
discussions, I realised that non-affiliated entrepreneurs employ an avoidance strategy in their 
disputes with state bodies and officials. They consider the available legal tools to be unreliable, 
insufficient, meaningless, and useless in litigation with government agencies. An appeal to the 
law is viewed as an exception, a problem, an action that violates normal life, and diverts scarce 
resources from a business.
At first glance, such attitudes to the courts could be explained by the well-known lack of trust 
in legal institutions amongst Russians (Arutiunian et al., 2008; Ledeneva, 2013; Hendley, 2014). 
However, according to my findings, the mobilisation of the law through court appeals is less 
available to ordinary individuals than to their politically affiliated counterparts because of prosaic 
concerns and institutional constraints. The list of negative incentives to litigate the state includes 
the lack of previous experience, or negative experiences of legal resistance, a shortage of specialist 
knowledge and information, and a lack of time or money to pay for lawyer’s services. Moreover, 
the demand for the use of legal mechanisms is limited by two procedural peculiarities of Russian 
legal proceedings. First, institutional constraints on the mobilisation of the law are linked to the 
duration of the appeals and litigation process: lawsuits could take months or years. Second, a 
court decision or a prosecutor’s order does not always result in re-instatement.
I appealed to the Commissioner for the Rights of Entrepreneurs. So, we are writing an appeal 
to the prosecutor’s office, we have gathered a round table at Rospotrebnadzor [Russian state 
agency responsible for consumer rights protection]. But there is no control, there is no final 
result. Do you think this is normal? Regulatory terms - two months for licensing, and then 
- seven. I go and appeal a chronicle of appeals. And the story is not over (Businesswoman, 
director of a dental clinic, record from a round table "Reducing administrative barriers", 
2016)
The costs associated with avoidance depend on the circumstances under which it arises (Hendley, 
2017, p. 71). Many of the respondents reflected on why they had not responded to the decisions 
made by the municipal administration, or to the absurd requirements imposed by federal control 
bodies. I support the arguments of other scholars (Paneyakh 2008, Chepurenko 2016) that 
entrepreneurs are often highly vulnerable and the unlimited power of the municipal and regional 
officials limits their capacity to even initiate court appeals. Avoidance became the best alternative 
to litigation because the city authorities interpret the mobilisation of the law as grounds to take 
action against those who initiate lawsuits. A lawyer who specialises in business cases said:
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People who complain that the city administration breaks formal rules... There are actions 
against them, for example, a land plot is not granted, lease contracts are not extended, and 
access to municipal contracts is limited. (Lawyer, male, face-to-face interview, 2013).
The image of weak actors illustrated by my empirical data correlates with previous research 
on small entrepreneurs in Russian regions, who in the 2000s also preferred ‘the way of passive 
adaptation and silence’ when responding to the inefficiency of state bodies and the opportunistic 
behaviour of officials (Nikula, 2011, p. 272). However, in contemporary Russia the use of legal tools 
of protection is limited by the economic dependence of entrepreneurs. I want to illustrate this 
thesis using the example of a municipal contract system. In many cases, small firms in Russia, 
especially in rural communities, are dependent on municipal bodies and local administrations for 
their survival. Through the system of municipal contracts, they order various goods and services, 
including such disparate examples as snow removal, food supplies and kindergarten enrolment – 
but then officials often refuse to follow these contracts. In the Komi Republic alone, 2,412 contracts 
worth the equivalent of 171 million roubles for the period 2015–2017 were not implemented.
My research shows that the opportunity to be heard, and the likelihood of being able to protect 
one’s interests through the courts is not determined by the content of the legal procedures. The 
experience of Russian small entrepreneurs with no access to political resources contributes to the 
socio-legal literature on the connection between power, social status, and the availability of the 
law. As Ewick and Silbey noted, weak social actors need more than just their will to resist the state 
and its representatives successfully (Ewick & Silbey, 2003, p. 1333). Being excluded from access to 
the law as a tool of protection, many of my informants expressed that a claim on the state was 
their single source of power for true justice. Illustrating the coexistence of frustration and belief, 
disappointment and hope, my research supports previous explorations of the relationship with the 
body of law in Russia, according to which avoidance has been, and still is, a widespread alternative 
to exit (Arutiunian et al., 2008; Hendley, 2017).
Conclusions and directions for future research
I have examined what it means to live in an overregulated state, and how written rules, norms, 
standards, and everything that is called ‘the law on paper’ are manifested in the everyday experience 
of small entrepreneurs, who confront the law and its representatives almost everyday day and 
everywhere. In order to capture the appearance of their everyday legality, I have focused on ways 
of coping with the paperwork and bureaucracy, including strategies to litigate the state that are 
realised through regulatory bodies and officials. The attempt to compare politically affiliated and 
non-affiliated entrepreneurs in provincial Russia also exposes the differing levels of availability and 
access to the law among socio-economic actors with different statuses, resources, and experience. 
This sociological approach to exploring the behaviour of law among businesspeople demonstrates 
that laws and written rules affect all entrepreneurs, but that many aspects of the law constrain 
or promote the available opportunities differently. As my analysis demonstrates, papereality plays 
diverse roles and permeates multiple spaces in the lives of entrepreneurs in contemporary Russia. 
Investigating their strategies for coping with paperwork and litigating Russian state bodies and 
authorities, I have shown why they depend to a large extent on the power of the overregulated 
state, rather than on the power of the law.
The cases I have presented here attest to the enduring power of the Russian state in producing, 
reproducing, and revising laws, written rules, and requirements. A central feature of that 
bureaucratic game has long been the unstable and unpredictable duration of the rules of the 
game. Consequently, the position of any small or medium-sized firm in relation to the Russian 
state remains vulnerable. In this sense, the additional opportunities to reduce the risks and costs 
available to politically affiliated businesspeople should be regarded as a way to increase business 
productivity and ensure sustainability. From this perspective, politically affiliated entrepreneurs 
may be designated as preferred market participants. On the other hand, privileged access to 
opportunities and resources stemming from access to political capital reinforces inequality 
among entrepreneurs. In other words, the different capacities of politically affiliated and ordinary 
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entrepreneurs to litigate against the state sheds light on the link between legality and social 
inequality. As Ewick and Silbey argued, the differentiated availability of the law among different 
social groups reflects the structure of social inequality (Ewick & Silbey, 2014, p. 223).
My research supports another statement by legal anthropologists: the narratives of social actors 
regarding the law and their perceptions of the law are related to their behaviour relative to the 
law, including their capacity to mobilise the law through the courts (Ewick & Silbey 1998: 56, 
128). Research on the mobilisation of the law in post-Soviet states by different types of firms, and 
for different purposes (e.g. for raiding), is still limited to the framework of criminology and legal 
proceedings (Rojansky, 2014; Markus, 2015; Dzmitrieva et al., 2016). Alternatively, my research was 
driven by the need to problematise the lack of attention to the structural limits on and social 
opportunities for litigation of the state by those social actors who are not professionally related to 
legal institutions (judges, lawyers, and attorneys).
Unexpectedly, my findings on the behaviour of entrepreneurs in relation to the law also refers to 
sociological studies of migration, where scholars challenged the ‘black and white’ conceptualisation 
of legality and shed light on the ambiguous, mixed, and intertwined coexistence of the limited and 
permitted effects of everyday legality (Calavita, 2006; Menjívar, 2011). I also did not rely on the 
dichotomous lens of the availability and non-availability of the law while I was comparing the 
various ways of coping with paperwork and bureaucracy among politically affiliated and non-
affiliated entrepreneurs. Hence, by avoiding such a sharp categorisation, I tried to include the 
many grey and ambiguous situations that might arise during a bureaucratic game.
The narrative analysis presented in my article demonstrates that the border between law and 
not-law is flexible; it also reveals the duality of the entrepreneurial consciousness regarding what 
is permitted and prohibited. Investigating court appeals initiated by ordinary consumers against 
private providers in the Ukraine, Kurkchiyan indicated that “opportunistic behaviour is widespread” 
among small and medium-sized firms, and that their “quasi criminal style is widely tolerated” 
(Kurkchiyan, 2013, p. 523). In this sense, there is still a strong need for more investigations into 
the link between legality and informality in transition economies. By drawing a clear theoretical 
distinction between formality and informality, numerous scholars have elaborated on the idea of 
formal-informal substitution in entrepreneurship (Webb et al., 2013). Alternatively, a number of 
socio-economic researchers studying transition economies have promoted an alternative vision of 
balancing formality and informality among entrepreneurs (Batjargal, 2007; Kurkchiyan, 2013; Lin 
et al., 2015; Chepurenko, 2016).
I attempted to address the capability of small entrepreneurs to decrease their vulnerability by 
either appealing to the court or utilizing other protective legal tools. Here I follow the idea of 
Markus, who demonstrated the availability, variety, and flexibility of bottom-up activities to 
protect property rights in new Russia and Ukraine (Markus, 2015). My research in some sense 
complements his study because I focus on small business owners instead of the large firms that 
he investigated. Markus stated that the hegemonic explanation of the role of law through state-
centric concepts is not sufficient for the post-Soviet period (Markus, 2015, pp. 9–11, p. 156). In other 
words, the literature on entrepreneurs’ relationship with the law should pay more attention to 
local practices, rather than only exploring institutional design and central policy initiatives.
The relationship between political connections and business in today’s Russia also incorporates 
the more fundamental question of interaction between private and state actors. Although various 
benefits accrue to political status, business interests are not necessarily the only – or even the 
leading – motive for businesspeople to enter politics. Moonlighting politicians who stay in the 
regional parliament for three or more terms lend credence to the idea that becoming a professional 
politician is a significant part of their strategy. There is also little attention paid to how business 
experience affects the ability of a businessperson to act as a politician, or to how politicians 
with various backgrounds differ in terms of professional quality and human capital. Finally, the 
widespread presence of businesspeople in the executive and legislative branches of regional and 
local governments might be a conscious effort on the part of elites to overcome the shortage of 
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professionals among public officials. This also relates to the link between policy outcomes and the 
capture of political bodies by business. 
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